Beau Madison Mount

Sir Peter Strawson Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy

Teaching

For the college, I teach papers on a number of topics in theoretical philosophy, including logic at all levels, Knowledge and Reality (the metaphysics and epistemology paper), and the philosophy of mathematics. In Michaelmas Term 2023, I shall also be responsible for the lectures for the Philosophy of Mathematics paper for the philosophy faculty.

Research

Most of my work centres on philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics, but I have interests in a number of other areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, formal epistemology, the history of early analytic philosophy, seventeenth-century rationalism, and just war theory.

I’ve published papers (often in collaboration with other philosophers) on formal theories of truth, the epistemology of universal claims, abstraction principles, the nature of logical consequence, and other topics. I am currently beginning work on a book about the philosophy of set theory, with a focus on post-1960 developments in the field. I also have shorter papers in progress on the epistemology of mathematical knowledge, the interpretation of second-order logic, and the ontology of money.

Selected Publications

(2023a) (with Catharine Diehl). “The Metaphysics of Opacity”. Philosophers’ Imprint 23/1: 1–29.

(2023b) (with Philipp Koralus, Vincent Wang, and Sean Moss) “Predicate Reasoning”. In Philipp Koralus, Reason and Inquiry: The Erotetic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 128–87.

(2021a) (with Rachel Elizabeth Fraser). “Absolutely General Knowledge”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103: 547–66.

(2021b) “Invariance without Extensionality”. In The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning, ed. Gil Sagi and Jack Woods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 80–96.

(2021c) (with Daniel Waxman) “Stable and Unstable Theories of Truth and Syntax”. Mind 130: 439–73.

(2019) “Antireductionism and Ordinals”. Philosophia Mathematica 27: 105–24

(2016) “We Turing Machines Can’t Even Be Locally Ideal Bayesians”. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5: 285–90.

(2015) “Higher-Order Abstraction Principles”. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4: 228–36.